Forbearance and Prompt Corrective Action

Narayana Kocherlakota and Ilhyock Shim

No 324, 2005 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Keywords: risky collateral; limited enforcement; banking regulation; optimal social contract. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Related works:
Journal Article: Forbearance and Prompt Corrective Action (2007)
Journal Article: Forbearance and Prompt Corrective Action (2007)
Working Paper: Forbearance and prompt corrective action (2005)
Working Paper: Forbearance and Prompt Corrective Action (2005)
Working Paper: Forbearance and Prompt Corrective Action (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed005:324

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