Continuous Time Models of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

Drew Fudenberg and David Levine

No 680, 2006 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: In this paper we consider a number of different ways that a sequence of discrete-time repeated games can approach a continuous-time limit. Our purpose is to clarify the effects of three different factors: 1) The distribution of signals in a fixed discrete-time game, 2) How the distribution (and notably its variance) changes with the period length, and 3) whether some of the player roles are filled by sequences of short-run players

Keywords: game theory; repeated games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A0 A1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed006:680

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