Private Monitoring without Conditional Independence

Johannes Hörner and Olivier Gossner

No 860, 2007 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: We prove that efficiency can be asymptotically achieved in the two-player's prisoner's dilemma under private monitoring. While we impose some restrictions on the monitoring structure, we do not require that the monitoring be either almost-perfect or conditionally independent.

Date: 2007
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://red-files-public.s3.amazonaws.com/meetpapers/2007/paper_860.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed007:860

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2007 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().