On the Desirability to Switch from a Standard Unemployment Insurance Program to a System of Unemployment Accounts

Christian Zimmermann and Stephane Pallage

No 772, 2010 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: This paper uses a heterogeneous agent model with liquidity constrained workers subject to employment shocks to study the feasibility of a system of unemployment accounts with the example of Oregon under various moral hazard scenarios. We determine the optimal policy parameter vector and compare outcomes with (optimal) unemployment insurance and self-insurance. We expand also the model to take into account skill heterogeneity across agents. We find that unemployment accounts are prefered with even small levels of moral hazard.

Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed010:772

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