Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch, and Systemic Bailouts

Jean Tirole and Emmanuel Farhi

No 822, 2010 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: which takes the form of a minimum liquidity requirement coupled with monitoring of the quality of liquid assets. We establish the robustness of our insights when the set of bailout instruments is endogenous and characterize the structure of optimal bailouts.

Date: 2010
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Related works:
Journal Article: Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch, and Systemic Bailouts (2012)
Working Paper: Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch and Systemic Bailouts (2010)
Working Paper: Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch and Systemic Bailouts (2010)
Working Paper: Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch and Systemic Bailouts (2009)
Working Paper: Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch and Systemic Bailouts (2009)
Working Paper: Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch and Systemic Bailouts (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed010:822

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