EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Trading Costs and Informational Efficiency

Cecilia Parlatore and Eduardo Davila

No 494, 2016 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: Abstract This paper studies the effect of trading costs on information diffusion and information acquisition in financial markets. For a given precision of investors' private information, an irrelevance result emerges when investors are ex-ante identical: the level of trading costs does not affect price informativeness or price volatility. This result holds independently of whether investors behave competitively or strategically and applies to both static and dynamic economies. When investors are ex-ante heterogeneous, trading costs affect price informativeness if and only if investors who disproportionately trade on information are more elastic than investors who mostly trade due to hedging. Trading costs always reduce information acquisition, even when price informativeness remains unchanged for a given amount of information. Our results matter to understand a) the consequences of cheaper financial trading and b) the effects of transaction taxes.

Date: 2016
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Trading Costs and Informational Efficiency (2021) Downloads
Working Paper: Trading Costs and Informational Efficiency (2019) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed016:494

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2016 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:red:sed016:494