Incumbecy Disadvantage in U.S. National Politics

Burcu Eyigungor and Satyajit Chatterjee ()
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Burcu Eyigungor: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

No 161, 2017 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: We document that postwar U.S. national elections show a strong pattern of ``incumbency disadvantage'': If the presidency has been held by a party for some time, that party tends to lose seats in Congress. A dynamic model of partisan politics with inertia in public expenditure policies and endogenously determined election outcomes is developed to explain this finding.

Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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Working Paper: Incumbency Disadvantage in U.S. National Politics (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed017:161

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