Discrimination, Regulations and the Optimal Hiring Process

Richard Ishac
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Richard Ishac: Queen's University

Review of Economic Analysis, 2024, vol. 16, issue 2, 221-241

Abstract: "This article provides a theoretical framework for comparing two different hiring practices: an unpaid competitive internship that is followed by a potential job offer versus a standard series of interviews. After fully characterizing the optimal hiring process, I show that high-ability minorities can be harmed by labour regulations that cause employers to shift towards a hiring process in which they are more likely to discriminate. Furthermore, preventing employers from giving truthful references is shown to exacerbate the obstacles to employment of a community traditionally facing discrimination. "

Keywords: "Discrimination; Regulations; Organizational Structure" (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D2 J15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ren:journl:v:16:y:2024:i:2:p:221-241

DOI: 10.15353/rea.v16i2.5189

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