Assurance valeur à neuf et vols d’automobiles: une étude statistique

Louis Bujold, Georges Dionne () and Robert Gagné
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Louis Bujold: Société canadienne d’hypothèques et de logement
Robert Gagné: HEC Montreal, Department of applied economics

No 97-1, Working Papers from HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management

Abstract: Moral hazard was analyzed in many studies in order to set the characteristics of optimal insurance contracts. Our research goes in that direction by verifying whether the replacement cost endorsement of automobile insurance contracts is a factor that explain automobile theft. This endorsement increases the potential gain when an event occurs. Moral hazard theory and the economic theory of crime suggest that such endorsement reduces incentives for prevention against theft and even can increase incentives to simulate an event. In order to verify these effects, we use a probit model that explains the probability that a car will be the object of a claim for theft. Our results indicate that this probability increases when a replacement cost endorsement is applicable, particularly at the end of the validity of the endorsement. However, our methodology cannot indicate that this increased probability represents insurance fraud, but show that this insurance contract endorsement increases the number of claims for theft and, consequently, insurance premia.

Keywords: Risque moral; assurance valeur à neuf; assurance automobile; fraude; vol; modèle probit (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 G14 G22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 1997-02-01
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:crcrmw:1997_001

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