Mesure des effets incitatifs à la prudence au volant créés par les sanctions et évaluation du pouvoir prédictif des infractions sur le risque routier

Georges Dionne () and Jean Pinquet ()
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Jean Pinquet: Université Paris-Nanterre

No 05-6, Working Papers from HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management

Abstract: This report studies the incentive effects of using violations to the Road Safety Code for automobile insurance pricing. The empirical analysis with data from Quebec clearly shows that demerit points are good predictors for accidents. The empirical analysis also indicates that the drivers’ risk decreases when the risk of permit suspension increases. We finally show that the Quebec 1992 structural change in insurance pricing increases the incentives for road safety.

Keywords: Incentive effect; violation to the Road Safety Code; auto insurance pricing; accident (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 G22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 62 pages
Date: 2005-07-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:crcrmw:2005_006

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