L'analyse de la coordination dans un modele d'economie artificielle

Pierre Barbaroux and Gilles Enee ()
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Gilles Enee: Université des Antilles et de la Guyane

European Journal of Economic and Social Systems, 2008, vol. 21, issue 1, 39-56

Abstract: This paper provides a multi agent model to study asymmetric coordination issues (minority games and "El Farol" model, Arthur, 1994). Within this framework, coordination emerges through learning with agents being formally represented by Adapted Pittsburgh-style Classifier Systems.

Keywords: Learning; Asymmetric Coordination; Minority Game; Multi-Agent Models; Classifier Systems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:ejessy:0074

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