Collective Evolution of Turn-taking Norm in Repeated Dispersion Games

Akira Namatame () and Noriko Fujii (Tanoura) ()
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Akira Namatame: National Defense Academy, Yokosuka
Noriko Fujii (Tanoura): National Defense Academy, Yokosuka

European Journal of Economic and Social Systems, 2008, vol. 21, issue 1, 83-105

Abstract: Using a game-theoretic model combined with the evolutionary model, we investigate the conditions under which desirable norms will emerge in various social interaction settings. Human beings appear to easily recognize the importance of a coordinated turn-taking behaviour as a mean to realize a fair outcome. We show turn-taking norm or alternating reciprocity emerge among networked agents who play dispersion games. We also investigate the co-evolutionary dynamics of networked agents in different network topologies and discuss the effects of the network topologies on evolution of such desirable norm. We show the symmetric local network under which each agent play with the same number of the closest neighbours fosters to emerge such desirable turn-taking norm.

Keywords: dispersion game; turn-taking; alternating reciprocity; social norms; social networks; rule evolution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:ejessy:0076

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