Praxiology of evil: Thinking about threats and their effectiveness

Timo Airaksinen ()
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Timo Airaksinen: University of Helsinki, Postal: helsinki,

Ethics and Economics, 2008, vol. 6, issue 1, 8

Abstract: How can one rationally imagine the strategies of threat if one wishes to influence the actions of others? In this paper, the author attempts to show that threats of coercion do not function in dual situations without a social context. He shows that they only function if one adds social elements such as institutions. In other words, the effective threats between rational subjects function only if they are reinforced by institutions. It is a type of Hobbesian argument which shows that social power does not exist in the natural state. Social power is a social construction.

Keywords: threat; coercition; evil; wickedness; social institution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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