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The Dodd-Frank Act, Solvency II, and U.S. Insurance Regulation

Scott Harrington ()
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Scott Harrington: The Wharton School, Postal: University of Pennsylvania, Health Care Management Department, 3641 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA, http://www.scottharringtonphd.com/

Journal of Financial Perspectives, 2013, vol. 1, issue 1, 105-116

Abstract: This article discusses key issues that policymakers should consider when evaluating potential changes to U.S. insurance regulation in the aftermath of the financial crisis, including implications of both the Dodd-Frank Act and the Solvency II initiative in the European Union. Fundamental differences in the U.S. between banking and insurance are emphasized, including much lower systemic risk potential and greater market discipline in insurance, and why those differences favor capital regulation and policyholder guaranty systems that reflect the distinctive features of each sector.

Keywords: Insurance Regulation; Insurers; Dodd-Frank Act; Solvency II; European Union Insurance Regulation; Systemic risk; Capital Regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G22 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:jofipe:0003

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