미국의 대중 반도체 수출통제 확대의 경제적 영향과 대응 방안(The Economic Impact of the U.S. Export Controls on China and Its Implications)

Hyok Jung Kim (), Jonghyuk Oh () and Hyuk Ju Kwon ()
Additional contact information
Hyok Jung Kim: KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP), Postal: [30147] Building C, Sejong National Research Complex 370 , Sicheong-daero, Sejong-si Korea, https://www.kiep.go.kr/eng/
Jonghyuk Oh: KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP), Postal: [30147] Building C, Sejong National Research Complex 370 , Sicheong-daero, Sejong-si Korea, https://www.kiep.go.kr/eng/
Hyuk Ju Kwon: KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP), Postal: [30147] Building C, Sejong National Research Complex 370 , Sicheong-daero, Sejong-si Korea, https://www.kiep.go.kr/eng/

No 23-20, Policy Analyses from Korea Institute for International Economic Policy

Abstract: 본 보고서에서는 최근 미국이 강화하고 있는 대중국 반도체 수출통제 제도가 미치는 경제적 영향에 대해 분석하였다. 미국의 대중국 수출통제는 반도체 제조시설과 AI 반도체를 중심으로 강화되는 추세이며, 해당 분야에서 우리나라의 반도체 제조를 비롯한 장비 산업에 영향을 미칠 수 있음을 알아보았다. 이러한 미국의 수출통제 제도에 대응해 우리나라는 반도체 산업 상류의 경쟁력을 강화하고 반도체 제조와 관련해 노출된 위험을 분산할 필요가 있다. This report examines the status of U.S. semiconductor export controls and estimates their impact. We focus on two major areas of semiconductor export controls implemented by the Biden Administration: restrictions on certain semiconductor manufacturing facilities and AI chips. In Chapter 2 reviews the history of U.S. semiconductor export controls, which progressively became stronger and broader in scope during the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations. In doing so, we confirmed that semiconductor export controls have become more frequent and in an effort to overcome the limitations of existing sanctions. Regarding export controls attempted by the Obama administration, American companies were able to circumvent them by assisting Chinese companies. The Trump and Biden administrations have closed such loopholes by expanding existing sanctions. The scope of the Trump administration’s sanctions against some companies, such as Huawei and SMIC, has been greatly expanded to include export controls targeting all of China under the Biden administration. Additionally, Chapter 2 reviews the concerns of various companies, associations, and organizations regarding these broader export controls and reviews key countries’ responses to the semiconductor supply chain. (the rest omitted)

Keywords: export control; semiconductor; economic impact; manufacturing facility; AI chips (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 236 pages
Date: 2023-12-29
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.kiep.go.kr/gallery.es?mid=a10101020000 ... no=11436&cg_code=C03 Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:kieppa:2023_020

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Policy Analyses from Korea Institute for International Economic Policy [30147] 3rd Floor Building C Sejong National Research Complex 370 Sicheong-daero Sejong-si, Korea. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Juwon Seo ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).