Learning in Trade Negotiations?: An Experimental Study

Hankyoung Sung ()
Additional contact information
Hankyoung Sung: University of Seoul

No 10-7, Working Papers from Korea Institute for International Economic Policy

Abstract: The purpose of this paper identifies learning in games in the experimental economic settings, and applies their results on real multilateral trade negotiations. This paper argues that structure of games including a veto player (Veto games) are similar to real multilateral trade negotiations in that the players do not possess identical power. This paper's main contribution involves showing that learning on power is dominant over learning on theory in Veto games. More importantly, this paper shows that players are concerned about how much they have gained in previous games in Veto games, although their memories generally do not last beyond the next game, and thus they tend to be selfish as they have less shares. Based on these results, it sees the possibility to be more generous in distribution of benefits; allowing players without veto power to retain special rights so that they would not be totally powerless, necessity of having 'respite' in the process of negotiations, and policy options for choosing partners for winning coalitions.

Keywords: Trade Policy; Multilateral Trade Negotiations; Veto; Trade Negotiations; Delay (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C78 D70 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2010-12-30
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2489777 Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:kiepwp:2010_007

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Korea Institute for International Economic Policy [30147] 3rd Floor Building C Sejong National Research Complex 370 Sicheong-daero Sejong-si, Korea. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Juwon Seo ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).