A Theoretical Approach to Evaluating Global Vaccination Plans

Youngseok Park () and Sangjun Yea ()
Additional contact information
Youngseok Park: KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP), Postal: [30147] Building C Sejong National Research Complex 370 Sicheong-daero Sejong-si Korea, https://www.kiep.go.kr/eng/
Sangjun Yea: KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP), Postal: [30147] Building C Sejong National Research Complex 370 Sicheong-daero Sejong-si Korea, https://www.kiep.go.kr/eng/

No 21-2, Working Papers from Korea Institute for International Economic Policy

Abstract: We study a game-theoretic model in which there are two periods of time in each of which agents (players) make a vaccination decision, and they choose the level of economic activities. In addition, we consider two kinds of policy measures 1) a vaccination passport policy and 2) a subsidy policy to promote vaccination, and compare the social welfare in each case. We find that introducing a vaccine passport policy or subsidizing to mitigate the expected costs from vaccination may decrease the social welfare when a vaccine is effective to reducing the extent of severeness of illness from virus infection but not successful in curbing the transmissibility of virus.

Keywords: Pandemic; Vaccination policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2021-03-31
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.kiep.go.kr/gallery.es?mid=a10105020000 ... no=10261&cg_code=C08 Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:kiepwp:2021_002

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Korea Institute for International Economic Policy [30147] 3rd Floor Building C Sejong National Research Complex 370 Sicheong-daero Sejong-si, Korea. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Juwon Seo ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).