Political Dynasties and Corruption: Evidence from Brazil

Savio Luan da Costa Oliveira (), Wallace Patrick Santos de Farias Souza () and Jevuks Matheus de Araújo ()
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Savio Luan da Costa Oliveira: Doutorando em Economia pela UFPB. Instituto Mauro Borges – IMB
Wallace Patrick Santos de Farias Souza: Professor do PPGE e do Departamento de Economia da UFPB
Jevuks Matheus de Araújo: Professor do PPGE e do Departamento de Economia da UFPB

No 4-2025, TD NEREUS from Núcleo de Economia Regional e Urbana da Universidade de São Paulo (NEREUS)

Abstract: In this study, we investigate whether dynastic mayors are more or less likely to engage in corruption when compared to non-dynastic mayors. Using data from random government audits conducted in the Brazilian municipalities, we use RDD on close elections to compare municipalities that barely had a dynastic candidate elected as mayor to those that did not. The identification of relatives in politics is based on the matching of their last names. We find that dynastic mayors are more likely to engage in practices of over-invoicing compared to non-dynastic mayors.

Keywords: Political dynasties; Corruption; Regression discontinuity design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C10 D73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2025-05-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:nereus:2025_004

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