Robust implementation in rationalizable strategies in general mechanisms

Takashi Kunimoto and Rene Saran
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Rene Saran: Department of Economics, University of Cincinnati

No 10-2025, Economics and Statistics Working Papers from Singapore Management University, School of Economics

Abstract: A social choice function (SCF) is robustly implementable in rationalizable strategies (RoRat-implementable) if every (interim correlated) rationalizable outcome on every type space agrees with the SCF.We first show that RoRat-implementation is equivalent to weak rationalizable implementation, a version of “belief-free rationalizable” imple-mentation. We then identify weak robust monotonicity (weak RM) as the characteriz-ing condition for RoRat-implementable SCFs in environments satisfying no-complete-indifference. In fact, we argue that a weak form of no-complete-indifference is necessary for RoRat-implementation. We next show that weak RM is equivalent to semi-strict ex post incentive compatibility and the preference-reversal condition – two properties that offer more intuitive interpretations. We then apply these results to quasilinear environments. We also consider robust implementation in interim equilibria and prove that strict robust monotonicity characterizes it under no-complete-indifference, closing a gap in the literature. We also clarify the relationships between different robust and belief-free rationalizable implementation notions discussed in previous work.

Keywords: Ex post incentive compatibility; rationalizability; interim equilibrium; robust implementation; weak (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D78 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 57
Date: 2024-03-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-mic and nep-sea
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Related works:
Working Paper: Robust Implementation in Rationalizable Strategies in General Mechanisms (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:smuesw:2024_003

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