Unanimous Constitutional Consent and the Immigration Problem

Stefan D. Josten () and Klaus Zimmermann
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Stefan D. Josten: Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg, Postal: Department of Economics and Organization, Helmut-Schmidt-University, University of, the Federal Armed Hamburg, Germany

No 31/2004, Working Paper from Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg

Abstract: This paper utilizes the cross-cutting cleavages approach to evaluate the probability of a unanimous constitutional consent and, based on these results, discusses the implications of immigration on an existing constitutional consent. It is shown that previous conclusions of beneficial effects stemming from a multitude of political dimensions for a unanimous constitutional consent crucially depend on the assumption of an extreme mode of intrapersonal compensation of constitutional majority and minority preferences. These conclusions are reversed once you consider more restrictive schemes of such intrapersonal compensation. Since, furthermore, the probability of constitutional consent unambiguously falls with a growing size of the collectivity, only a policy of selective and controlled immigration will be able to guarantee with regard to the existing cleavages of a society that the existing constitutional consent will not be damaged or destroyed, whereas uncontrolled immigration, possibly based on ethical norms, will risk the breakdown of any constitutional consent in a society.

JEL-codes: H10 H41 K10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2004-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Unanimous constitutional consent and the immigration problem (2005)
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