Pricing of Pollution: The Coase Theorem in the Long Run

Harry Frech

Bell Journal of Economics, 1973, vol. 4, issue 1, 316-319

Abstract: In an earlier article in The Bell Journal, Tybout argues that even in a zero transaction costs model, bribery to reduce pollution and compensation charges for it result in different total profits, and thus in different long-run behavior. Therefore, the Coase Theorem is refuted for the long-run case.

Date: 1973
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