Monopoly Pricing Structures with Imperfect Discrimination

Hayne Leland and Robert A. Meyer

Bell Journal of Economics, 1976, vol. 7, issue 2, 449-462

Abstract: While some firms, such as airlines, may have both the informational and legal capabilities for identifying and segmenting customers into different markets, most firms do not. When only the distribution characteristics of consumers is known, we characterize the situation as one of imperfect discrimination. Individuals in such markets cannot be identified; thus, all must face the same price structure. Some discrimination is nonetheless possible through the use of nonuniform pricing policies.

Date: 1976
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