A "Signal-Jamming" Theory of Predation

Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole

RAND Journal of Economics, 1986, vol. 17, issue 3, 366-376

Abstract: We propose a new theory of predation based on "signal-jamming." In our model the predator's characteristics are common knowledge, while the entrant is uncertain of his own future profitability. The entrant uses his current profit to decide whether to remain in the market, and the predator preys to "jam" or interfere with this inference problem. Thus, our model differs from those based on "reputation effects," in which the predator preys to signal information about himself.

Date: 1986
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (131)

Downloads: (external link)
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261%2819862 ... O%3B2-O&origin=repec full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rje:randje:v:17:y:1986:i:autumn:p:366-376

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://editorialexp ... i-bin/rje_online.cgi

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in RAND Journal of Economics from The RAND Corporation
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().