Middlemen as Experts

Gary Biglaiser

RAND Journal of Economics, 1993, vol. 24, issue 2, 212-223

Abstract: I show that a middleman can be welfare improving in all equilibria in a quite general bargaining model when adverse selection is present. Conditions are determined for when a middleman is most likely to be in a market. Examples of the theory are also presented.

Date: 1993
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