Physician Financial Incentives and Cesarean Section Delivery

Jonathan Gruber and Maria Owings

RAND Journal of Economics, 1996, vol. 27, issue 1, 99-123

Abstract: The "induced-demand" model states that in the face of negative income shocks, physicians may exploit their agency relationship with patients by providing excessive care. We test this model using an exogenous change in the financial environment facing obstetrician/

Date: 1996
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Working Paper: Physician Financial Incentives and Cesarean Section Delivery (1994)
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