Object-Oriented Bayesian Networks for a Decision Support System

Julia Mortera, Paola Vicard () and Cecilia Vergari ()

No 144, Departmental Working Papers of Economics - University 'Roma Tre' from Department of Economics - University Roma Tre

Abstract: We study an economic decision problem where the actors are two rms and the Antitrust Authority whose main task is to monitor and prevent rms potential anti-competitive behaviour. The Antitrust Au- thority's decision process is modelled using a Bayesian network whose relational structure and parameters are estimated from data provided by the Authority itself. Several economic variables in uencing this de- cision process are included in the model. We analyse how monitoring by the Antitrust Authority a ects rms cooperation strategies. These are modelled as a repeated prisoners dilemma using object-oriented Bayesian networks, thus enabling integration of rms decision process and external market information.

Keywords: Antitrust Authority; Bayesian networks; mergers; model integration; prisoners dilemma; repeated games. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C11 C44 C73 D81 D83 L13 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34
Date: 2012-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rtr:wpaper:0144

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