Strategic Properties of Heterogeneous Serial Cost Sharing

Eric Friedman ()
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Eric Friedman: Rutgers University

Departmental Working Papers from Rutgers University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We show that serial cost sharing for heterogeneous goods, and a large number of other cost sharing mechanisms, have the same strong strategic properties as serial cost sharing for homogenous goods, including uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium for all utility profiles and cost functions, dominance solvability, solvability in overwhelmed actions, and robustness to coalitional deviations. We describe several applications to cost/surplus sharing, learning and the Internet.

Keywords: serial cost (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-10-20
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rut:rutres:200017

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