Do Symbolic Penalties Work? Evidence from Compulsory Voting Laws in Argentina

Miriam Malament
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Miriam Malament: Department of Economics, Universidad de San Andrés

No 17, Young Researchers Working Papers from Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia

Abstract: Do symbolic penalties work? This paper provides causal evidence that even minimal, unenforced legal sanctions can influence civic behavior. I study a 2012 reform in Argentina that introduced optional voting for 16- to 17-year-olds, while voting from age 18 remained compulsory and formally subject to a small, unindexed fine of 50 pesos. Using a regression discontinuity design and administrative data from 15 national elections between 2015 and 2023, I find that turnout increases by about 20 percentage points at age 18, despite negligible enforcement. Complementary evidence from national survey data suggests this effect reflects expressive compliance: symbolic penalties act as normative signals, activating a sense of civic duty rather than deterring through material sanctions. The response is especially pronounced among lower-income and lower-education youth. These findings offer rare causal evidence that symbolic penalties can shape civic behavior by appealing to internalized civic norms rather than fear of punishment.

Keywords: elections; compulsory voting; Argentina; regression discontinuity design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C31 D72 K10 P16 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 43 pages
Date: 2025-09, Revised 2025-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-law
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sad:ypaper:17

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