A Case for Private Provision but Collective Ownership of Public Goods

William D. Gerdes

The American Economist, 1998, vol. 42, issue 1, 90-94

Abstract: One strategy for generating Pareto results in a public good model is to create an environment where traders internalize the public good externality. The model presented here accomplishes this by separating the provision and ownership of public goods. Such goods are privately provided but collectively owned. Under this arrangement, Lindahl prices are generated through the voluntary exchange activities of consumers. Persistent attempts to free ride are not consistent with maximizing behavior which leads to internalization.

Date: 1998
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:amerec:v:42:y:1998:i:1:p:90-94

DOI: 10.1177/056943459804200110

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