Elite Collusion in Indonesia: How It Has Both Enabled and Limited Executive Aggrandizement

Marcus Mietzner

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 2024, vol. 712, issue 1, 223-234

Abstract: After a largely successful post-authoritarian transition, Indonesia has experienced democratic backsliding since the 2010s. This backsliding accelerated under the presidency of Joko Widodo (2014-2024), but it has not yet pushed the Indonesian polity into a full-blown autocracy. I argue that Indonesia’s specific pathway to democratic backsliding prefigured this outcome. While elites have colluded to share power and allow the president to engage in executive aggrandizement, they have set limits to the latter’s potential authoritarian ambitions. For example, they rejected Widodo’s attempt to extend his time in power beyond the constitutionally allowed two terms. Thus, elites have both produced executive aggrandizement and contained its scope. This pattern has protected Indonesian democracy from a full collapse, but it has produced a gradual decline, reducing the chances of democratic revitalization through formal or contentious politics.

Keywords: Indonesia; democratic backsliding; elite collusion; executive aggrandizement; autocracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:anname:v:712:y:2024:i:1:p:223-234

DOI: 10.1177/00027162241309436

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