Privatisation and ‘Light-Handed’ Regulation: Sydney Airport

Michael O'Donnell, Miriam Glennie, Peter O'Keefe and Seung-Ho Kwon

The Economic and Labour Relations Review, 2011, vol. 22, issue 1, 65-80

Abstract: This paper examines the privatisation of Sydney Airport and the regime of ‘light-handed’ monitoring of service quality and airport charges that followed the sale in 2002. The arguments for privatisation are reviewed, in particular the need for increased competition and/or appropriate regulation where a former public monopoly, such as Sydney Airport, is sold. The aftermath of the privatisation of the airport has led to complaints by the major airlines and consumers of ever increasing charges for use of the airfield and for car parking and other services. This highlights that the ‘light-handed’ monitoring regime has not constrained the airport's ability to charge monopoly rents. The aftermath of privatisation has resulted in labour shedding, outsourcing and a focus on cost minimisation by the airport's management.

Keywords: Airport privatisation; price monitoring; monopoly pricing; employment conditions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ecolab:v:22:y:2011:i:1:p:65-80

DOI: 10.1177/103530461102200104

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