Procedural and party effects in European Parliament roll-call votes

Bjørn Høyland
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Bjørn Høyland: CICERO, Center for International Climate and Environmental Research and PRIO, Peace Research Institute, Norway, bjorn.hoyland@stv.uio.no

European Union Politics, 2010, vol. 11, issue 4, 597-613

Abstract: I extend the standard spatial model of legislative voting to account for vote-specific party inducements and procedural differences. Focusing on voting in the 1999—2004 European Parliament, I find evidence of vote-specific party inducements in a large share of the roll call votes. Furthermore, MEPs position themselves differently across procedures. As most roll call votes are taken on non-legislative votes, these estimates may overemphasize voting pattern on these votes and downplay voting pattern on legislative votes. As such, these estimates may be a poorly suited for studying within party heterogeneity on legislative votes.

Keywords: bayes; codecision; European Parliament; voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:11:y:2010:i:4:p:597-613

DOI: 10.1177/1465116510379925

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