With a lot of help from their friends: Explaining the social logic of informational lobbying in the European Union

Adam W Chalmers

European Union Politics, 2013, vol. 14, issue 4, 475-496

Abstract: This article examines the informational advantages of interest group networking strategies and how these relate to the provision of policy-relevant information to EU decision-makers. Interest groups obtain a great deal of policy-relevant information through their network connections. In particular, weak tie networks are strong in terms of information sharing among network members. Well-informed groups are best positioned to provide much needed information to EU decision-makers and to thus influence the EU policy-making process. Using original survey and interview data, this article tests the extent to which weak tie strategies help interest groups provide information to the Commission, Parliament and Council. A central finding of this article is that strong ties, rather than weak ties, grant the most important informational advantages.

Keywords: European Union; information provision; interest groups; networking; strength of weak ties (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:14:y:2013:i:4:p:475-496

DOI: 10.1177/1465116513482528

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