Dynamic Representation

Hermann Schmitt and Jacques J. A. Thomassen
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Hermann Schmitt: MZES, University of Mannheim, Germany
Jacques J. A. Thomassen: University of Twente, The Netherlands

European Union Politics, 2000, vol. 1, issue 3, 318-339

Abstract: This article asks two questions: first, why are party voters less favourable towards specific EU policies than party elites?; second, how does political representation of EU preferences actually work, is it an elite- or a mass-driven process? The data-sets of the European Election Studies 1979 and 1994 are analysed which involve both an elite and a mass survey component. In contrast to earlier research, it appears that political representation of EU preferences works rather well regarding the grand directions of policy making, and that party elites behave responsively in view of changing EU preferences among their voters.

Keywords: public opinion; political representation; electoral behaviour; democratic deficit (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:1:y:2000:i:3:p:318-339

DOI: 10.1177/1465116500001003003

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