Top-down or bottom-up? The selection of shadow rapporteurs in the European Parliament

Frank M Häge and Nils Ringe
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Frank M Häge: Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Limerick, Limerick, Ireland

European Union Politics, 2020, vol. 21, issue 4, 706-727

Abstract: Shadow rapporteurs play an important role in developing the European Parliament’s collective policy positions and in defending them in inter-institutional negotiations. This study sheds light on the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of shadow rapporteur selection. Qualitative insights from practitioner interviews and a quantitative analysis of shadow rapporteur data from the 7th European Parliament (2009–2014) indicate that the appointment process is primarily one of bottom-up self-selection by group members based on their policy interests. The party group leadership, in the form of group coordinators, plays an important coordinating role when there is competition for a shadow rapporteurship. However, the role of group coordinators is more akin to a third-party arbiter of competing demands than a mechanism of top-down control by the leadership, as suggested by principal-agent theory.

Keywords: Delegation; European Parliament; principal-agent theory; self-selection; shadow rapporteurs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:21:y:2020:i:4:p:706-727

DOI: 10.1177/1465116520934865

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