Joint bodies in the European Union's international agreements: Delegating powers to the European Commission in EU external relations
Markus Gastinger and
Andreas Dür
European Union Politics, 2021, vol. 22, issue 4, 611-630
Abstract:
In many international agreements, the European Union sets up joint bodies such as ‘association councils’ or ‘joint committees’. These institutions bring together European Union and third-country officials for agreement implementation. To date, we know surprisingly little about how much discretion the European Commission enjoys in them. Drawing on a principal–agent framework, we hypothesise that the complexity of agreements, the voting rule, conflict within the Council, and agency losses can explain Commission discretion in these institutions. Drawing on an original dataset covering nearly 300 such joint bodies set up by the European Union since 1992, we find robust empirical support for all expectations except for the agency loss thesis. Our findings suggest that the European Commission is the primary actor in the implementation of many of the European Union's international agreements, allowing it to influence EU external relations beyond what is currently acknowledged in the literature.
Keywords: Agreement implementation; European Commission discretion; EU external relations; joint bodies; principal–agent model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:22:y:2021:i:4:p:611-630
DOI: 10.1177/14651165211027397
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