When does the European Commission Pursue Noncompliance?

Sivaram Cheruvu

European Union Politics, 2022, vol. 23, issue 3, 375-397

Abstract: Under what conditions will international compliance-monitoring institutions pursue violations of international law? The European Commission’s infringement procedure is a multi-step process that culminates at the Court of Justice of the European Union when a member state has allegedly violated European Union law. The Commission, however, does not have meaningful enforcement powers, and may potentially spend valuable time and resources on a case only for a member state to not comply with European Union law. To manage this opportunity cost of pursuing other violations of European Union law, I argue that the Commission will strategically delay advancing a case through the infringement procedure when it anticipates that the political conditions will be more favorable for compliance in the future. I provide evidence that the Commission delays infringement proceedings when it expects the election of a new government that will be more likely to comply than the incumbent government.

Keywords: European Commission; European Union law; Euroscepticism; infringement procedure; noncompliance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:23:y:2022:i:3:p:375-397

DOI: 10.1177/14651165221087635

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