Biased Ministers, Inefficiency, and Control in Distributive Policies

Fabio Franchino and Anne J. Rahming
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Fabio Franchino: School of Public Policy, University College London f.franchino@ucl.ac.uk
Anne J. Rahming: London School of Economics and Political Science A.J.Rahming@lse.ac.uk

European Union Politics, 2003, vol. 4, issue 1, 11-36

Abstract: The literature asserts that legislators are unlikely to adopt inefficient policies unanimously. Yet the systematic and unanimous increase in quantities of Total Allowable Catch, under the auspices of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), is inefficient by internationally recognized standards. This article develops a game of distributive politics to explain this puzzle. The game is based on the assumption that specialized Council formations are composed of preference outliers and behave like `runway institutions'. The article shows how, over a period of 16 years, ministers were significantly less concerned with environmental protection, were more supportive of (agri-)fishery issues, and were more right-wing than their governments. The article also tests the conservationist preferences of the European Commission. Finally, we map these preferences into the policy output of the CFP and show how the Council deals with problems created by its own decisions and by national implementation through the restraining of national authorities and delegation to the Commission.

Keywords: control; Council formations; fisheries; inefficiency; policy preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:4:y:2003:i:1:p:11-36

DOI: 10.1177/1465116503004001579

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