The Rotating Presidency of the European Council as a Search for Good Policies

Ken Kollman
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Ken Kollman: University of Michigan, USA kkollman@umich.edu

European Union Politics, 2003, vol. 4, issue 1, 51-74

Abstract: The rotating presidency of the European Council is a curious, and unusual, institutional feature. I propose a formal theoretic model that compares a variety of decision-making procedures, including rotating the leadership position in a decision-making council, referendums on each policy issue, and electing a Council president. From the results of the model I conclude that the current version of the rotating presidency has a lot to recommend it. Rotating agenda-setting authority allows for the exploration of new mixtures of policies that might not be discovered or tried under other kinds of procedures. However, I also argue that, once the European Union expands to over 20 members, the procedure may no longer be sustainable.

Keywords: European Council; European Union; presidency; political institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:4:y:2003:i:1:p:51-74

DOI: 10.1177/1465116503004001581

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