Europe Divided?

Liesbet Hooghe

European Union Politics, 2003, vol. 4, issue 3, 281-304

Abstract: This article compares preferences for Europeanizing 13 policies among European elites, national elites, and public opinion. Elites are more willing to cede national authority in sovereignty areas, but citizens are more favorable to EU social policies. Are there contrasting logics at work? The answer is two-sided. Elites and public preferences are similar in that both are least enthusiastic about Europeanizing high-spending policies. Here is a common distributional logic: shifting authority could destabilize vested interests. However, as the single market intensifies labor market volatility, the public seeks to contain this distributional risk through selectively Europeanizing market-flanking policies. In contrast, elite preferences are consistent with a functional rationale that conceives European integration as an optimal solution for internalizing externalities beyond the national state.

Date: 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:4:y:2003:i:3:p:281-304

DOI: 10.1177/14651165030043002

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