Rapporteurship Allocation in the European Parliament

Michael Kaeding
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Michael Kaeding: Leiden University, The Netherlands, kaeding@fsw.leidenuniv.nl

European Union Politics, 2004, vol. 5, issue 3, 353-371

Abstract: This study addresses a central aspect of the micromanagement of the European Parliament, the determinants of rapporteurship allocation. Focusing on the period from 1995 to 1999, I match rapporteurship assignments in the committee on environment with occupational, group membership, ideological and national data. The study asks which of the two distinct features of committees, distributional concern or informational provision, determines rapporteurship selection. My analysis shows that the group of rapporteurs does not mirror the composition of the full plenary. Moreover, the results are consistent with the view that a multifaceted combination of the two concepts of ‘demanding’ and ‘informative’ committees promises a richer explanation of rapporteur assignment than any one of those theories alone.

Keywords: committee; environment; European Parliament; neo-institutionalism; rapporteur; rational choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:5:y:2004:i:3:p:353-371

DOI: 10.1177/1465116504045157

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