The Power of the Presidency in EU Council Decision-making

Jelmer Schalk, René Torenvlied, Jeroen Weesie and Frans Stokman
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Jelmer Schalk: Utrecht University, The Netherlands, J.Schalk@uu.nl
René Torenvlied: Utrecht University, The Netherlands, R.Torenvlied@fss.uu.nl
Jeroen Weesie: Utrecht University, The Netherlands, J.Weesie@fss.uu.nl
Frans Stokman: University of Groningen, The Netherlands, F.N.Stokman@rug.nl

European Union Politics, 2007, vol. 8, issue 2, 229-250

Abstract: Research on the presidency of the EU shows mixed results. Although most scholars agree that the EU presidency is not able to advance its domestic interests in the European forum, Tallberg (2006) provides evidence for presidency effects. In the present paper, we empirically estimate presidency-based power in the Council of the European Union on the DEU data — a large-scale data set containing EU policy issues from various policy areas. We show that holding the presidency does significantly and positively contribute to the bargaining power of member states, but only in the final stages of decision-making.

Keywords: EU decision-making; EU presidenc; power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:8:y:2007:i:2:p:229-250

DOI: 10.1177/1465116507076431

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