The Council Presidency

Andreas Warntjen
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Andreas Warntjen: University of Twente, The Netherlands, A.K.Warntjen@utwente.nl

European Union Politics, 2008, vol. 9, issue 3, 315-338

Abstract: The potential impact of the EU Council Presidency on legislative decision-making has been frequently identified. This article provides an empirical analysis of the Presidency's influence on decision outcomes based on a large-n data set. Two counterfactuals are used to represent consensual decision-making and hard bargaining in the Council. The role of supranational actors is controlled for directly. The findings show that a member state benefits from holding the Presidency during the final stages of the legislative proceedings. Besides the support of supranational actors, the regression analysis controls for the voting threshold, the type of proposal and salience.

Keywords: Council of the European Union; Council Presidency; EU legislation; power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:9:y:2008:i:3:p:315-338

DOI: 10.1177/1465116508093487

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