Mobilizing Bias in Europe

Scott L. Greer, Elize Massard da Fonseca and Christopher Adolph
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Scott L. Greer: University of Michigan, USA, slgreer@umich.edu
Elize Massard da Fonseca: University of Edinburgh, UK, e.m.fonseca@sms.ed.ac.uk
Christopher Adolph: University of Washington, Seattle, USA, cadolph@u.washington.edu

European Union Politics, 2008, vol. 9, issue 3, 403-433

Abstract: What effects do interest groups have on the democratization and legitimacy of the European Union (EU)? Interest groups can democratize the EU only to the extent that they do not replicate inequalities. We use a newly constructed database to look for inequalities: Are the big organizations in Brussels the same as the ones in the EU member states? Are some member states' lobbies more active than others? And does the structure of EU lobbying create insiders and outsiders itself? We find representative biases in favor of powerful incumbents, groups from some member states and wellresourced groups.

Keywords: European Union; health policy; interest groups; lobbying (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:9:y:2008:i:3:p:403-433

DOI: 10.1177/1465116508093491

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