Power Markets and Market Power*

David M. Newbery

The Energy Journal, 1995, vol. 16, issue 3, 39-66

Abstract: Privatization was intended to make the English bulk electricity market sufficiently competitive to avoid the need for regulation, but two generators set the spot price over 90% of the time though they supply less than 60% of total electricity generated. Their market power depends on their share ofnon-baseload plant, and agreed divestiture here should increase competition. The paper argues that the contract market, which makes entry contestable, will ensure that long-run average prices are kept at the competitive entry level, with increased competition mainly increasing medium-run volatility and short-run economic efficiency.

Keywords: Electricity market; electricity prices; UK; market power; competition; regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:enejou:v:16:y:1995:i:3:p:39-66

DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol16-No3-2

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