The Price of Oil and Conflict in OPEC

All M. Reza

The Energy Journal, 1984, vol. 5, issue 2, 29-34

Abstract: The price-setting behavior of the oil-exporting nations is influenced by the various elasticities of demand for and supply of oil, and the long-run optimal price trajectory is also influenced by the rate of interest and reserves (see, for example, Pindyck, 1978, and Reza, 1981). Since it is generally agreed that the long-term price elasticity exceeds the short-term elasticity (in absolute value), measuring the latter can give a clearer picture of the former. The short-term price elasticity of demand for OPEC oil is also of interest because short-term financial constraints have apparently led at least some members of OPEC to weigh the short-run outcome of their pricing decisions more heavily. The issue addressed here is the magnitude of the short-run price elasticity of the demand for oil supplied by the OPEC core (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar) and of OPEC as a group.

Keywords: Oil prices; OPEC; Conflict; World oil demand (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1984
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:enejou:v:5:y:1984:i:2:p:29-34

DOI: 10.5547/ISSN0195-6574-EJ-Vol5-No2-2

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