Bundling the procurement of sports infrastructure projects: How neither public nor private actors really benefit

Martijn van den Hurk

Environment and Planning C, 2016, vol. 34, issue 8, 1369-1386

Abstract: Public-private partnerships for infrastructure development are often conceived as puzzling governance tools. A peculiar case in Belgium has been the procurement of multiple similar projects to single private sector partners who design, build, finance and maintain infrastructure for a fixed period— bundled procurement . Under the umbrella of the Flemish Sports Infrastructure Program, several of these bundles were tendered, particularly in order to achieve economies of scale. However, bundled procurement came at a price. This article scrutinizes its tense relationship with local governments' interests and competitive tendering. It shows that competition was hampered to a certain extent, but an equally important role in this respect was played by high contractual demands. As for local interests, in some cases the voice of local governments was given too much weight during the procurement phase. Consequently, political interests intervened and uncertainty arose.

Keywords: Public-private partnerships; bundled procurement; local government; competition; sports infrastructure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:envirc:v:34:y:2016:i:8:p:1369-1386

DOI: 10.1177/0263774X15614672

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