Expectations-Achievement and Overthrows: An Empirical Test of the Relative Deprivation Hypothesis

D N Laband
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D N Laband: Department of Economics, University of Maryland, Baltimore County, Cantonsville, MD 21228, USA

Environment and Planning C, 1985, vol. 3, issue 4, 417-426

Abstract: There is a strong theoretical supposition in the political science literature that civil unrest in a political jurisdiction is a consequence of the ‘relative deprivation’ of the population within its borders. This proposition is tested empirically in this paper, with respect to incidence of attempted coups d'etat across fifty-four countries in 1981. The findings suggest that relative economic deprivation does precipitate political unrest. Social deprivation, as measured by repression of the population, also incites a demand for political change, although repression has a predictable supply-side effect of dampening the population's ability to translate demand for political change into actuality.

Date: 1985
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:envirc:v:3:y:1985:i:4:p:417-426

DOI: 10.1068/c030417

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