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Saving the Last Person from Radical Scepticism: How to Justify Attributions of Intrinsic Value to Nature without Intuition or Empirical Evidence

Alexander Pho and Allen Thompson

Environmental Values, 2023, vol. 32, issue 1, 91-111

Abstract: Toby Svoboda (2011, 2015) argues that humans cannot ever justifiably attribute intrinsic value to nature because we can never have evidence that any part of non-human nature has intrinsic value. We argue that, at best, Svoboda's position leaves us with uncertainty about whether there is intrinsic value in the non-human natural world. This uncertainty, however, together with reason to believe that at least some non-human natural entities would possess intrinsic value if anything does, leaves us in a position to acquire evidence that non-human nature has intrinsic value. We appeal to Michael Huemer's (2013) Probabilistic Reasons Principle to argue that we have direct reasons to not act in ways destructive to non-human nature, even if this reason is defeasible. Hence, if having intrinsic value just is being a source of direct reasons, it also implies that non-human nature has intrinsic value.

Keywords: Intrinsic value; non-human nature; direct reasons; probabilistic reasons principle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:envval:v:32:y:2023:i:1:p:91-111

DOI: 10.3197/096327122X16386102424010

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