Superpower Dispute Initiation: An Empirical Model of Strategic Behavior

Christopher K. Butler

International Area Studies Review, 2011, vol. 14, issue 3, 61-90

Abstract: A method is presented for empirically modeling simultaneous decisions using the estimation technique of bivariate probit. This technique is used to examine the directed dispute-initiation behavior of the superpowers during the Cold War. Power-transition concepts of satisfaction and rates of capability change can be used to explain directed dispute-initiation behavior. In particular, the international influence of the rival translates into a superpower's dissatisfaction, making dispute initiation by that superpower more likely, ceteris paribus. Additionally, a rapid strengthening of the challenger, ceteris paribus, increases the likelihood of dispute initiation in either direction. Changes in the hegemon's capabilities, though consistent with power-transition theory, have no effect on dispute-initiation behavior. These effects hold even while controlling for various domestic conditions in each country.

Keywords: conflict studies; strategic modeling; bivariate probit (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:intare:v:14:y:2011:i:3:p:61-90

DOI: 10.1177/223386591101400303

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